Last week, the SCOTUS held that unions representing public employees can collect litigation costs as part of a compulsory fee authorized under state law, even if the litigation does not directly involve the collective bargaining unit. Locke v. Karass (2009) __ U.S. __. The vote was 9-0 with Justice Breyer writing the majority opinion and Justice Alito adding a concurring opinon in which Roberts and Scalia joined. The question presented was:
In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, this Court unanimously “determined that the [Railway Labor Act], as informed by the First Amendment, prohibits the use of dissenters’ [union] fees for extraunit litigation.” Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991) (opinion of Blackmun, J., citing Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)). In Lehnert, a four-member plurality therefore held “that the Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public sector.” Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion, concurring in part in the judgment announced by Justice Blackmun, reasoned that “there is good reason to treat [Ellis and the Court’s other statutory cases] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule.” Id. at 555. May a State, nonetheless, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees for purposes of financing a monopoly bargaining agent’s affiliates’ litigation outside of a nonunion employee’s bargaining unit?
The answer was yes, albeit a narrowly tailored yes.
the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses as long as (1) the subject matter of the (extra-local) litigation is of a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local, e.g., litigation appropriately related to collective bargaining rather than political activities, and (2) the charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., the contributing local reasonably expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national’s resources used for costs of similar litigation on behalf of the contributing local if and when it takes place.
...
Applying Lehnert’s standard to the national litigation expenses at issue demonstrates that they are both appropriately related to collective bargaining activities and reciprocal, and are therefore chargeable. First, the record establishes that the kind of national litigation activity for which the local charges nonmembers concerns only those aspects of collective bargaining, contract administration, or othermatters that the courts have held chargeable. No one here denies that under Lehnert this kind of activity bears an appropriate relation to collective bargaining. See, e.g., 500 U. S., at 519. Second, although the location of the litigation activity is at the national (or extra unit) level, such activity is chargeable as long as the charges are for services that may ultimately inure to local members’ benefit by virtue of their membership in the national union. Ibid. Respondent local says that the payment of its affiliation fee gives locals in general access to the national’s financial resources—compiled via contributions from various locals—which would not otherwise be available to the local when needed to effectively negotiate, administer, or enforce the local’s collective bargaining agreements. Because no one claims that the national would treat respondent local any differently from other locals in this regard, the existence of reciprocity is not in dispute. Pp. 11–13. 498 F. 3d 49, affirmed.
You can download the Locke v. Karass opinion in PDF directly from the SCOTUS website at this link. The opinion will not affect workers in right-to-work states, as those workers are generally not subject to mandatory union dues or agency fees.
Comments